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Abstract Co-management is a system or a process in which responsibility and authority for the management of
common resources is shared between the state, local users of the resource as well as other stakeholders, and where they
have the legal authority to administer the resource jointly. Co-managemnt received increasing attention in recent
years as a potential strategy for managing fisheries.
This paper presents and discusses results of a survey undertaken in the Kenyan part of Lake Victoria to assess the
conditions - behaviour, attitude and characteristics of resource users, as well as community institutions - that can
support co-management. lt aniyses the results of this survey with respect to a series of parameters, identified by
Pinkerton (1989), as necessary precondth' for the successful inclusion of communities involvement in resource
management.
The survey was implemented through a two-stage stratified random sampling technique based on district a,d beach size
strata. A total of 405 fishers, drawn from 25 fish landing beaches, were interviewed using a structured questionnaire.
The paper concludes that while Kenya's Lake 'ictoria fishery would appear to qualify for a number of these preconditions,
it would appear that ¡t fails to qualify in others. Preconditions in this latter category include the definition of boundaries in
fishing grounds, community members' rights to the resource, delegation and legislation of local responsihility and
authority. Additional work is required to further elaborate and understand these shortcomings.
Introduction
Fisheries in many parts of the world are under pressure or in crisis, raising doubts about the effectiveness of
current management regimes. The problems facing global fisheries arc myriad, but can be summarised in
three categories. The first is biological - the threat of depletion of fish stocks. The second is economic: the
over-accumulation of labur and fishing capital, described by Pearse (1994: 16) as "...the waste of labour
and capital in redundant catching capacity, excessive costs and declining incomes". This paper is
particularly concerned with the third problem, that of governance, which arises because the management of
many fisheries is excessively centralised, with a disproportionate amount of power retained by the state.
Governments commonly manage fisheries through legal and administrative measures - so called 'command
and control regimes' - which regulate when, where and how fishing activities should take place (Dubbink
and Vliet, 1995; Johnston. 1992; Pearse, 1994). Advocates of the command and control regimes argue that
administrative means, such as rules and licences, especially if backed by threat of force, can constrain and
guide individual and group strategies towards responsible resource use.
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The Kenyan sector of Lake Victoria is no stranger to this style of management. In the pre-colonial era, the
¡nain regulatory mechanisms were the formal and informal mechanisms embedded within the social and
cultural fabric of fishing communities (Geheb, 1997; Owino, 1999). The colonial authorities introduced
state-based formal regulations, which effectively shifted responsibility for the fishery away from lake-side
comnmnities into the hands of the state, changing the lake from a community-managed property into a state-
managed property. This command and control regime has persisted into post-independence, progressively
eroding community-based resource management structures. This has been facilitated by failure of the legal
framework to recognise community-based institutions as well as by the increasingly integrated economy of
the lake.
Following the introduction of the Nile perch in the 1950's, catches from Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery
peaked in 1994 at 254,000 tonnes (Kenya Fisheries Department data). Since then, fish landings have
declined by some 34% to 158,876 tonnes in 1998 (Kenya Fisheries Department data). Besides these
declines, there are reports of uncontrolled and increasing fishing effort, use of destructive fishing methods
and decreasing opportunities for local communities to benefit from the fisheries, amongst other issues
(Abita and Jansen, 1997; World BankIGEF, 1996). Lake Victoria fisheries, thus, depict a typical example of
a common property where the applied management regime seems to have failed in achieving compliance.
Of the three East African countries sharing Lake Victoria, the problem of management failure is most
observable in Kenya, which owns only 6% of the lake, but has the highest and fastest growing fishing
intensity and, evidently, the largest proportion of over fished waters.
It comes as no surprise, then, that command and control regimes are often criticised as being outdated,
inadequate and ineffective. They are blamed for increasing the problems of implementation, compliance
and control of fisheries regulations (Kooiman 1993; Stone, 1975). Dubbink and Vliet (1995) explain that
command and control regimes face problems at the instrument level (the choice of appropriate regulatory
instruments) as well as at the organisational level. The latter difficulties arise because resource governance
is mainly organised at the macro-level of state bureaucracy, making irrelevant the potential contribution of
the meso-level (tile level of civic and private contribution) and the micro-level of the individual
appropriator or finn. Government systems are often distant, impersonal, insensitive, understaffed, under-
funded and too bureaucratic. Hence, they have a limited capacity to regulate and monitor what goes on in
widely scattered fishing grounds, often with highly localised and complex community, economic and social
structures (Jentoft et al, 1998; Pomeroy et al, 1997).
The failure of command and control regimes has prompted a re-thinking of fisheries management strategies
(Qf. Crean and Syrnes, 1996; Pitcher et al., 1998). This has lead to several trains of thought, including
market-based managerial regimes (cf. Gordon, 1954; Neher, 1988; Pearse, 1994), and 'adaptve
management' strategies (Ludwig et aL, 1993; Walters and Hilborn, 1978; Walters and Holling, 1990). A
third outcome of this debate has been the development of an extensive literature on 'co-management'.
The principle behind co-management is that some responsibility for the management of resources should be
transferred from the state to the resource's user groups. Sen and Nielsen (1996: 407) define co-management
as "...an arrangement where responsibility for resource management is shared between the government and
user groups". Jentoft et al (1998: 423) define it as "...the collaborative and participatory process of
regulatomy decision-making among representatives of user groups, government agencies and research
institutions". Co-management is, therefore, a collaborative agreement between the government and user
groups, in which both parties share authority for resource management to varying degrees. The basis of co-
management is that neither local communities nor central governments can, on their own, successfully
manage common resources. Collaborative managerial agreements between tile state may, therefore,
ameliorate some of tile problems of command and control regimes described above. In addition, Jentoft etal
(1998) argue, resource users should be allowed to participate in regulatory decision-making,
implementation and enforcement because they have a wide knowledge and experience of the resource base
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and its dynamics. Furthermore, their participation in management.gives the managerial process legitimacy
(Dubbink and Vliet, 1995; Jentoft eta!, 1998).
Comanagement is not a fixed idea, which sceptics claim is its major undoing - that it lacks a strong
theoretical foundation. Others see co-management practices as remnants of the past, ideal situations,
requiring a particular cultural foundation or communal values that have become increasingly rare in modern
settings. Jeatof.t et aJ(1993) attribute such siuism to an overly n. ow understanding of the social theory
about the role and nature of institutions. However, the negative criticisms of co-management should not
overshadow its potential benefits.
For successful co-management to be effected, certain conditions are essential. First, it requires an
appropriate institutional and organisational framework for common property resource governance. Second
is the requirement that resource user groups are adequately organised to act collectively for their common
good. As Baland and Plattean (1996) point out, co-management may have very little success if tser groups
are totally incapable of collective action to manage resources. Olson (1965) explains why communities may
not act collechvely to solve common or public problems, and by extension, why co-management may be
difficult to establish.
A major contribution towards identif'ing conditions for the successtuil inclusion of communities of
resource users into management hierarchies has been the work of Pinkerton (1989). Basing her work on
British Columbia fisheries in Canada, this thinker has developed a set of conditions which, she says, are
necessary if local-level managerial institutions are to be 'robust' (see also Ostrom, 1990; Dustin ecker and
Ostrom, 1995). These conditions include the following:
(a) Clearly defined boundaries.
(h) Membership of the user groups is clearly defined.
(e) The user groups are cohesive.
The user group has had prior experience with organisation.
Time benefits of management clearly exceed its costs.
(f Tl1ose affected by management also participate in management.
Management rules are enforced.
The user group has legal rights to organise.
There is co-operation and leadership at the community level.
There is decentralised and delegated authority.
There is coordination between the government and the community.
This paper draws upon the above criteria to analyse the data presented and to evaluate co-management
potentials for Kenya' s Lake Victoria fishery. The data set upon which it is based was collected from 25
landing sites along the shores of the Kenyan sector of Lake Victoria. A two stage stratified random
sampling strategy was employed to select these sites, based on the sizes of landings, and the district of
location. Data were collected by a team of four researchers using a structured questionnaire. A total of 405
respondents were interviewed, of which 43% had fished for more than 11 years, 20% for 6-10 years, while
37% had fished for five years or less.
Results and Dìscussion
Clearly defined boundaries: the physicil boundaries of the aiea to be managed should be distinct so that
flsher groups can have an accurate knowledge ofthem. The boundaries should be based on an ecosystem
that tlsheiis' cm easily observe and widerstand. The teiritory enclosed by a boundary should be ofa size that
allows Ihr nianagerndnt with available technology e.g. transport and communication.
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This section examines the extent to which fishers perceive boundaries within the fishery, and limits its analysis
to physical and ecosystem boundaries. At the present stage of management in Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery, it
is premature to evaluate bounded areas in terms of amenability to management.
Physical boundaries of the area to be managed
The Fisheries Act (1991) under which Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery falls, allows anyone to fish in the lake's
waters as long as s/he has a valid fishing license from the Depai linent of Fisheries (Republic of Kenya, 1991).
This license is granted on payment of a fee and, in practice, is rarely subject to any other condition. Anyone
from any part of Kenya can obtain a fishing license to fish on Lake Victoria. In this way, there is little in the
way of any officially sanctioned limitations to entry into Lake Victoria's fisheries.
From our sample, 61% of fishers did not agree that fishing communities should have the power to determine
who could or could not fish from Lake Victoria. In addition, 95% agreed that anyone could fish in the waters
adjacent to their community or beach. In fact, most fishers (93%) indicated that they often meet with fishers
from other communities when they go out fishing. This shows that many fishers do not recognize any
boundary restrictions to their landing sites. Furthermore, a majority of fishers (70%) believe that the waters
next to their beach belong to the government. This negates any attempt to exclude non-community members
and define proprietorship over specified water territories.
There are, however, international political boundaries on Lake Victoria that fishers clearly know about.
Certain water-based geographical features and landmarks demarcate such boundaries. For example, in the
Port Victoria area, Kenya-Uganda border is known by fishers to be just behind Sumba Island. In the Sio
Port area, the outlet of Sio River into the lake marks the same boundary. In the Karungu area, the Migingo
Islands located on the Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania tripoint demarcates the boundary separating the three
countries. Thus, there is sufficient clarity as to the demarcation of international boundaries. In many cases
fishers are reminded of the border line by being repeatedly arrested, fined or having their gear confiscated
for trespassing international boundaries.
The administrative district boundaries on land are known by fishers but are not clearly identified in the water.
This is because each beach falls in a location, district and province which are clearly known to the fishers.
District Fisheries Officers normally regard the water adjacent to beaches in their district, and within the
international boundary, to be within their jurisdiction. On this basis, fishers may be expected to understand the
water around their beaches to belong to their district. Where two beaches share a district boundary however,
such as the Osieko/Nambo landing which is divided by the Busia/Bondo District boundary, it is not easy to
place the water around the beaches in either district.
Another concept of physical boundary may be in terms of where fishers land their fish. Fishers are genei ly
sure of where they will land their fish. Each fisher has a beach to which he or she belongs, and which each of
them refers to as 'my' beach. Any fisher who does not belong to a particular beach and wishes to land fish there
must seek permission. This may be in form of verbal permission from beach authority (3 8%), a letter of
introduction from the previous beach leader (37%) or paying a landing-rights fee (locally called a kanyaga fee)
(22%). Only 3% of fishers thought they could land on a beach to which they do not belong, without seeking
permission.
Respondents further indicated that permission, if granted, would entitle a fisher from another beach to fish in
their water. Of the fishers interviewed, 92% stated that anyone with permission would be allowed to fish in the
waters adjacent to their community. Thus, fishers recognize the beach as a boundary that excludes non-
members. The beach can, therefore, be used as basis for defining a boundary since the demarcation is clearly
understood and accepted by most fishers. Any boundary formed on the basis of a beach is likely to be
effective.
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exceptions, there is a ogh specificity of gear types according to beaches. Fishers on one beach, with few
exceptions, tend to use one type of fishing gear. Thus, certain beaches are specifically for dagaa fishing, while
others are Nile perch or tilapia beaches. Some beaches, such as Bukoma in Busia district, specialize on beach
seining. Other beaches will only use gillnets, longlines or mosquito seines.
The I u'e other possible indicators of membership. In this survey, we asked fishers whether or not they thought
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does not negaI: it ihc fishes in euya's Lake Victoria fishery to view themselves as belonging to
particular ethnic g'o ps, a pa'Liculai occc'proional group and to specific communities.
140
Group cohesion: the fisher's group or organization should permanently reside near the area to be managed.
There should be a hzb degree of homogeneity, in terms of lthisho, ethnïity, religion or fishing gear type,
withth the group. Local ideology, customs and belief systems should create a willingness to deal with
collective problems. Finally, there should be a common understandiiig of the problem and of alternative
strategies and outcomes.
Group cohesion is necessarily a component of membership, which has been discussed in the previous section.
According to Pinkerton (1989), group cohesion requires a common understandkig of the problem and of
alternative strategies and outcomes. Fishers interviewed during this survey were asked whether or not they
agreed or disagreed with a series of statements concerning the fishery at present compared to its state five
years previously (1995-1999). Their responses are displayed in Figure 1. Fishers are also in broad agreement
concerning the problems on the lake. The largest proportion of these felt that lack of regulation in the fishery
was its most serious problem (24%), followed by gear theft (16%). Fishers felt that the third most important
problem was the use of illegal fishing techniques (14%).
As we have seen from the previous section, there is high degree of homogeneity amongst fishers in this fishery
in terms of ethnicity and kinship as well as in terms of gear specificity. At the same time, fishers are in broad
agreement about the problems of the fishery and agree that there is a decline within it.
Fig. 1: Fisher's perceptions of thestate of the resource base copared foflvé years previously - -
(Source. SEDAWOG, 2000)
There are more boats
There is less fish diversity
Fishing pays lessI There is less fish
More illegal fishing techniques
Fishing trips are longer
Fish are smaller
Existing organization: the fishers have some prior experience with traditional community-based systems and
with organization, where they are representative of all resource users and stakeholders interested in fisheries
management.
Original forms of traditional community systems of administration are rare within this fishery, although there
may still exist roles for community elders. These have been largely replaced by a government administrative
system, where a chief appointed by the state heads a location, whose boundaries have been drawn along areas
traditionally occupied by particular clans. There are, nevertheless, community-based organizations such as
beach leaders who are elected by fishers.
Most respondents in the survey have past or current experience with one or more types of community-based
organizations. Of the 405 respondents interviewed for the survey, 294 have been a member of a community-
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based organization. This may be a cooperative society, a marketing group or a savings and credit group based
on the beach. Virtually all beaches have a beach committee charged with the responsibility of organizing
fishers and handling disputes between fishers. The Beach Leader, sometimes called 'chairman', heads the
beach committee. The authority of the Beach Leader, and by extension, the mandate of the beach committee, is
fully recognized by most fishers. Of all fishers interviewed, 84% stated that in the event of encountering a
fisheries-related problem, they would first complain to the beach leader. In contrast, less than 10% of fishers
would, in the first place, report their fishery-related problems to the Fisheries Department. Another 4%
indicated that they would report fishery-related problems to the community elders or fellow fishers.
Furthermore, most fishers (67%) stated they would obey the instructions of the Beach Leader i i a fisheries
related matter, while only 30% of fishers would take instructions from the Fisheries Department representative
on the beach.
In summary, most fishers have had experience with coimnunity-based organizations, although these may not
be 'traditional' ones. The system of beach committees, headed by Beach Leaders, represent an organ for
organizing fishers and solving community disputes and fisheries-related matters. It is well understood and
accepted by nearly all fishers, and may serve as a legitimate basis upon which to build a co-managerial
foundation.
Benefits exceed cost: community-based organizations are more likely to be robust' where individuals
have the expectation that the benefits to be derived from paiiIciatíon th, and compliance with, the
organization will exceed the cost ofin vestments in it.
Co-management essentially implies that some of the costs of managing th fishery will bè transferred from the
state (or society) to the communities using that resource. Whatever role is found as suitable for local fishing
communities to play in the co-mailagenicilt pi ocess, it is a new cost to that community which, otherwise, they
would not be paying. The benefits to be derived from co-management, (such as better fish yields and
community's exclusive use rights over the resource within a defined boundary), must be balanced against the
costs of managing the fishery. These costs may include the allocation of the community's time, effort and
resources to surveillance, defense and retaliation.
Fishers will participate in management if they expect the management outcome to solve their resource
problems. As Figure 1 shows, most fishers perceive a decline in the resource base over the last 5 years. The
worsening resource status is possibly contributed to by two factors: an increase in the number of fishing
boats (93%) and in the number of illegal fishing techniques now being used to catch fish (80%). As a result
of this situation, fishing pays less now than 5 years previously. As such, the benefits of management could be
the reversal of declining yields and an increase in fishers' income. A community highly dependent on a
particular resource could be expected to attach high value to that resource. In this case, the benefits of
achieving a healthy fishery, by reversing the trends of resource scarcity, must rank very highly in the priorities
of local fishing communities. This survey did not, however, collect data to ascertain this.
In summary, this study lacks sufficient information as to whether benefits of co-management in the Lake
Victoria fisheries would exceed the costs.
Participation by those affected: community-based institutions are more hkely to be 'robust' when most
the individuals affected by management arrangements are included th the group that makes, and can
change, these arrangements.
The Fisheries Act (Republic of Kenya, 1991) does not define any role for involving fishing communities in
the management of the fishery. The Fisheries Act itself has been drafted without the participation of fishing
communities. Despite this omission, most fishers would prefer to directly participate in decision-making
concerning the management of the fishery. In the survey, 84% of the fishers stated that fishers should be
allowed to participate in rule-making. One of the areas in which fishers would like to be involved is in
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applying sanctions to offenders. The survey results revealed that 76% of fishers would like fishing
communities to be allowed to punish offenders. Most fishers, however, did not agree to the suggestion that
that no more fishers, boats and nets should be allowed on the lake (71%). Similarly most fishers (61%)
disagree that fishing communities should be allowed to determine who can or cannot fish.
One of the reasons whì fishers strongly feel they should participate in management is because they are
dissatisfied with the current management system of the lake. A small majority (54%) stated that the
Fisheries Department does not do well protecting the fish stocks. As evidence of their lack of participation
and little contact with the Fisheries Department personnel, most fishers are not aware of sorne of the basic
fishery regulations contained in the Fisheries Act. Asked to state the minimum mesh size of gilinets allowed
on the lake (5 inches), 52% specified a wrong mesh size, while only 41 % provided the correct answer.
In summary, fishers are willing to participate in making decisions affecting them, and in implementing
sorne of them. However, at the moment there is little opportunity for them to do so.
Management rules enforced the management rules are simple. Monitoring and enforcement can be
effected and shared by all fishers.
Q uestions concerning the efficacy of implementation and enforcement of state fishing regulations produced
variable - and sometimes contradictory - results. On the one hand, 39% of respondents agreed that the
fishing regulations were 'no good', and 77% of respondents said that they believed that their fellow fishers
obeyed these regulations. On the other hand, a large proportion of fishers (44%) indicated that they saw
fishers breaking fisheries regulations 'all the time', while 41%, of respondents saw fishery regulations
broken 'sometimes'. Only 16% of respondents said that they never saw fisheries regulations being broken
on their beaches. Indeed, 42% of respondents agreed that one of the reasons for widespread illegal gear use
was because the Fisheries Department failed to prevent such gear use. 59% of respondents said that
Fisheries Department personnel 'sometimes' came to their landings, while half of respondents said that they
never saw the Fisheries Department destroying illegal gear seized. When questioned about specific
regulations, fishers felt that, in all cases, these regulations were effective except in the case of closed
seasons, which just over half of the respondents interviewed for this survey felt were 'useless' (Table 1).
The most efficacious regulations would appear to be the poison ban, licensing of fishers and boat
registration. In the case of the poison ban, Kenya had, at the time of the survey, implemented a ban on
fishing at night when fish poisoners were believed to be most active. This action was prompted following
fears of fish contamination on European Nile perch markets and their subsequent closure. It is perhaps not
surprising that boat registration and licensing being are viewed as efficiently applied regulations - the
Kenya Fisheries Department obtains an estimated US$ 100,000 annually from the collection of license and
boat registration fees, fish movement permits, court fines and export licenses (Government of the Republic
of Kenya etal., 1995).
Table 1 Fishers' erce'tion on the efficac of various fisheries re'u!ations (Source: SEDAWOG, 2000).
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Regulation Effective : - Unaware of
egulaionT- Useless
Mesh size control 63.9% 2.2% 33.8%
Closedfishingareas 57.7% 2.5% 39.8%
Closed fishing season 47.8% 2% 50.2%
Poison ban 79.1% 1% 20%
Trawling ban 66.9% 8.7% 24.4%
Minimum fish-size regulations 65.4% 2% 32.6%
Licensing 78.8% 0.7% 20.4%
Boat registration 92.3% 0.5% 7.4%
The apparent contradictions in the above results may lie in the way in which questions were phrased. Where
questions appeared to directly criticise the Fisheries Department, respondents tended to answer as
favourably as possible about it. Where questions were only implicitly linked to the Fisheries Department
(such as questions on rates of illegal gear use) fishers were more willing to point out deficiencies.
These results give a general impression that fishers do feel that fishing regulations are being broken in the
fishey, but they are unwilling to criticise the Fisheries Department for this. These results cannot tell us
whether or not fishers view the regulations as simple, not whether or not fishers feel that they would be able
to implement these same regulations.
Local rights to organize: the fisher group has the riIit to organize and make arrangements related to its
needs. There is enabling legislation from the government defining and clariivthg local responsibility and
authoiity.
A major weakness of initiatives aimed at involving local communities in fisheries management is the lack
of legal recognition of such an approach. The Fisheries Department lias encouraged the formation of beach
committees, lead by a beach leader, on each beach. The beach committee has man)' roles and
responsibilities, some of them defined, while others are just assumed. The following are some of the roles:
Presenting the fishing community's problems to the Fisheries Department.
Solving conflicts between fishers, or any other persoiis residing on their beach.
e) Serving as a link between the government and the community, through which any inward or outward
communication for the community is channelled.
Convening and chairing community meetings.
Receiving visitors on the beach.
The responsibilities of the beach leader and committee listed above, however, are not legislated. They are
sectoral arrangements by the Fisheries Department, aimed at letting communities do those tasks which the
Fisheries Department finds hard to perform. The lack of legislation is a major weakness of the system, since
the beach leader assumes powers and authority for which s/he has no legal right to exercise. The Fisheries
Act itself does riot mention or specify any roles for local communities. It does not mention or recognise the
institution of the Beach Committee. The Act entrusts almost all the functions of fisheries management to
the Fisheries Department through the Director of Fisheries.
In summaly, Kenya's Lake Victoria fisheries lacks any enabling legislation 'from the government defining
and clarifying local responsibility and authority. The Fisheries Department has encouraged the 'formation of
beach committees, headed by a beach leader, but this authority is not legislated. Despite this, fishing
communities recognise the legitimacy and authority of the beach leader and the beach committee, as will be
discussed below.
Go-operation and leadership at communiiv le ve!: there is an incentive and ïvi7lingnes on the pai: cf
fishers to actively par1iciatc, with tithe and effort and money, lu fisheries nlanagemei2t. There is an
individual or core group vino takes leadershju re.sponsibiÏity ibr the ìnanugenidnt process.
In almost all the fishing communities, there is a core group that will take leadership responsibility for the
management process. The survey revealed that all beaches (100%) have a beach committee, headed by a
beach leader. The survey results also indicate that various other community organisations were present on
Lnost of the beaches They included 'fisher's co-operatives, marketing groups, savings and credit groups and
other more informal fisher groups. These groups can potentially take responsibility for some aspects of
managing the fishery or improving the welfare of fishers. Most fishers (77%) belong to one or more of these
community organisations.
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The beach leader is one of the most important administrative figures in Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery.
Asked to say to how they would react given different problems, the majority of fishers will seek solutions
from the beach leader or some other, internal, community mechanism (Table 2).
As previously indicated, fishing communities also claim to have community designed fishing regulations.
In the survey, only 11% of fishers said that no such regulations existed. The rest either confirmed that there
were community-made rules in their beaches, or did not know that such rules existed. Apart from this,
members of the community often spend time attending village meetings discussing problems facing the
community and the lake. Fishers will also informally discuss amongst themselves problems facing the
fisheries.
Table 2: Fisher's reactions given certain problems (Source: SEDAWOG, 2000)
Fishers themselves recognize their potential role in ensuring that regulations are followed. In the survey,
94% of fishers agreed that there was a need for the government and fishing communities to take regulations
more seriously. As previously discussed, most of the fishers (76%), agree that fishing communities should
be allowed to punish offenders, and 84% of all fishers agree that fishing communities should be allowed to
participate in rule making.
In summary, there is willingness on the part of the fishers to participate with time and effort in fisheries
management. The survey did not reveal whether or not fishers would also contribute fiscal resources
towards management activities. On nearly all beaches, there is also an individual or core group, in form of a
beach leader and beach committee, who can take leadership responsibilities for the management proccds.
Other community organisations such as co-operatives, fishers' groups, marketing groups and savings and
credit organisations can also play a part in certain aspects of fisheries management.
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When you ha ve problems in the fishery, to whom do you complain first?
Authority Percent of sample
Beach leader 84.4%
Fisheries Department representative 9.4%
Others 6.2%
In a fisheries-related matter, whose instructions would you obey?
66.7%Beach leader
Fisheries Department representative 29.4%
Others 3.9%
Ifa fellow fisher were using an illegal fishing technique, what would you do first?
Report him/her to beach leader 541%
Report himlher to Fisheries Department 19.8%
Nothing 14.8%
Confront himlher 6.4%
Report him/her to the police 3.0%
Other 1.9%
Ifa fisher accused another ofstealing a net, who will solve the dispute?
A meeting of the community or its elders 77.5%
A government representative (mcl. FD) 18.0%
The police 2.2%
Other 2.3%
Ifa community were to accuse your comm unity ofstealing its nets, who will solve the dispute?
Meeting of community leaders 56.3%
The government 36.5%
The police 5.7%
Other 1.5%
Decentralisation and delegation of authorily the govern/neat lias established fauiial policy and/or laws
for the decentralisafion of administrative functions and the delegation of management responsibility and/or
authority to local government and local go vernin eat organisation levels.
The Government of Kenya has established a policy of decentralised management and development
priortisation, through the District Focus for Rural Development policy. At the District level there is a
District Development Committee (DDC), chaired by the District commissioner. Members of this committee
include heads of various government departments at the district level, representatives of the loca!
government and members of parliament, amongst others. There are various tasks and responsibilities of the
DDC but overall, it allocates development resources within the distTict.
Iii the same spirit of decentralisation and delegation, the Fisheries Department has informally let some tasks
of management to be carried out by the fishing community alone or jointly with the Fisheries Department.
Often these are tasks that the Fisheries Department finds hard to perform, or lacks the means to do so. For
example, the local communities can patiol the lake if they have the means to do so. The beach leader can
also look out for those breaking fisheries regulations around the beach and report them to the Fisheries
Department. The beach leader may even apply sanctions on some fisheries-related offences. For very minor
offences, the beach leader and his committee eau punish offenders by fining them or suspending them from
operating on the beach. For serious offenees, such as fish poisoning, the community leaders may take the
offender to the Fisheries Department for prosecrrtion. However, the actions taken by the beach leader are
limited in that some community members, and even government authorities, can dispute their legality. In
fact, this is often the case.
In summary, the Fisheries Department has informally decentralised and delegated some authority to fishers'
communities, especially those tasks that the Fisheries Department is not in a position to do. However, this is
limited by the lack of clear legal backing for communities to perform these roles.
co-ordination between government and community, a coordinatory body is established, external to the
local group or organisation and with representation from the fishers' group to or olganisation and
government to monitor the local manageaient arrangements for resolving conflict.s, arid rein force local rule
enforc em caL
In Kenya's Lake Victoria fisheries there is nobody that qualifies for the above description. In effect, fishing
communities largely operate on their own, with little reference to, or support from, any external body. The
Government, through the Fisheries Department, legally performs the supervisory role, but the relationship is
so polarised, that little co-ordination is effected. The Government organ has no representation from fishers'
communities to ensure a coordinated response to management problems. At the same time, the Fisheries
Department is not represented in the beach committee.
Summary and conclusion
In sunimary, fishers recognize and understand international boundaries, local administrative boundaries on the
land, boundaries based on landing beaches, and ecosystem boundaries demarcating breeding and closed areas.
There are no clear boundaries demarcating fishing grounds to separate different communities. Although
membership association with fishing communities occurs at different levels - such as a beach, a particular
fishery or an ethnic group - none of these define rights to fish.
Fishing groups are, to a large extent, homogeneous in terms of ethnicity and kinship as well as gear types. At
the same time, fishers commonly perceive problems facing the fishemy. These factors indicate that fishers have
some degree of cohesion, which is important for establishing local insthntions for co-management. Most
fishers have experience with community-based organizations. The system of beach committees, headed by a
Beach Leader, as an organ for organizing fishers and solving community disputes and fisheries-related matters,
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is well understood and accepted by nearly all fishers. Fishing communities recognise the legitimacy and
authority of the beach leader and the beach committee.
Fishers are willing to participate, with their time and effort, in making decisions affecting them and the
fisheries, and in implementing some of these decisions. But at the moment there are few opportunities for
them to do so. There are a number of government regulations that apply to the fishery, although fishers
commonly break many of them. Despite this, fishers think that most of the applied regulations are
potentially effective. Insofar as monitoring and enforcement are concerned, these are roles restricted by law
to the Fisheries Department alone, and there is little scope for fishers to be involved. There is lack of ai-i
enabling legislation from the government defining and clarifying local responsibilities and authority. On
nearly all beaches, there is an individual or core group that does, or can, take leadership responsibilities for
the management process. These include the beach leader, beach committee and other community
organisations such as co-operatives, fishers' groups, marketing groups and savings and credit organisations.
These can play a role in fisheries management.
In conclusion, the study has revealed that Kenya's Lake Victoria fisheries qualify in a number of the ways with
the pre-conditions, identified by Ostrom (1990), for the successful establishment of local level-institutions to
support co-management. There are, however, some critical conditions that are still lacking, such as the clear
definition of boundaries in fishing grounds, community members' rights to the resource, and the delegation
and legislation of local responsibilities and authority.
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